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MANNER OF STATING CAUSE OF ACTION
CARL C. WHEATON
"The complaint shall contain: A plain and concise statement of the
facts constituting the cause of action, without unnecessary repeti-
tion." This innocent-looking statement is found, with but practically
unimportant changes, in the statute books of over thirty states of our
country and in the federal equity rules.' The Massachusetts law pro-
vides for pleading substantive facts and that of Wisconsin for stating
ultimate facts. The Pennsylvania enactment says that evidence should
not be pleaded. The federal equity rule demands the alleging of ulti-
mate facts and the omission of any mere statement of evidence. These
changes from the usual statute make no real difference, as the ordinary
law has been interpreted to mean that the constitutive, final, opera-
tive, substantive, or ultimate facts, not evidence, should be pleaded.2
'ALASKA COMP. LAWS (1913) § 889; ARK. CIV. CODE ANN. (Crawford, 1934)
§ 1O9; CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. (Deering, 1931) § 426; COLO. ANN. CODE (Court-
right's Mills, 1933) § 55; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5506; IDAHO CODE ANN.
(1932) § 5-605; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 2-1004; IOWA CODE (1931)
§ II1I; KAN. REV. STAT. (1923) § 60-704; Ky. CIv. CODE OF PRAC. (Carroll,
1932) § go; MAss. ANN. LAWS (1933) Part 3, § 7; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§ 9250; MIss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 521; MO. REv. STAT. (1929) § 764; MONT. REV.
CODE (Choate, 1921) § 9129; NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) § 20-804; NEV. CoMP.
LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 8594; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 105-404;
N. C. CODE ANN. (1931) § 506; OHIo ANN. CODE (Throckmorton, Baldwin's Rev.,
1930) § 11305; OKLA. STAT. (1931) § 198; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 1-604; PA.
STAT. (1920) § 17185; S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1932) § 456; S. D. CoMP. LAWS (1929)
§ 2346; TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 8726; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (I933)§ i04-7-2; VT. PuB. LAWS (1933) § 1574; WASH. REV. STATS. ANN. (1932) § 258;
WIs. STAT. (1933) § 263-03; Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (93I) § 89-1004; FEDERAL
EQUIrY RULE 25.
2Dreisbach v. Beckham, 178 Ark. 816, 12 S. W. (2d) 4o8 (1929); Miles v.
McDermott, 31 Cal. 270 (1866); Quinn v. Reilly, 198 Cal. 465, 245 Pac. io91
(1926); City & County of Denver v. Bowen, 67 Colo. 315, 184 Pac. 357 (1919);
Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Ada County v. Ada County, 38 Idaho 778, 226 Pac. 290
(1924); Fee v. State, 74 Ind. 66 (I881); Outing Kumfy-Kab Co. v. Ivey, 74 Ind.
App. 286, 125 N. E. 234 (1919); Riley v. Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n,
177 Iowa 449, 159 N. W. 2o3 (I916); Manwaring v. Reynolds, io8 Kan. 777, 196
Pac. 1O86 (1921); Davis v. Watkins, 241 Ky. 261, 43 S. W. (2d) 712 (1931); Bur-
gett v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., 109 Minn. 216, 123 N. W.41i (19o9); Nicholsv.
Nichols, 134 MO. 187,35 S. W. 577 (1896); Reilly v. Cullen, 159 MO. 322, 6o S. W.
126 (rgoo); Moormeister v. Hannibal, 18o Mo. App. 717, 163 S. W. 926 (i914);
Berry v. Adams, 71 S. W. (2d) 126 (Mo. App. 1934); Enterprise Sheet Metal
Works v. Schendel, 63 Mont. 529,2o8 Pac. 933 (1922); First State Bank of Philips-
burg v. Mussigbrod, 271 Pac. 695 (Mont. 1928); Johnson v. Johnson, I5 P. (2d)
185
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Parenthetically, it should be stated that, as the usual statute does not,
in so many words, make this distinction as to the type of facts to be
pleaded, it is difficult to see how the courts can properly read such a
differentiation into it. The only plausible ground on which the result
can be reached is to avoid prolixity, but that is not a correct ground
for the judiciary's adding to the terms of a statute. Again, it may be
that sometimes, as will be shown later, it is advisable to plead evi-
defnce. Hence, the words of the statute should not be contracted as
they are. However; it has been done and, probably, it will take legisla-
tion to change the result. It should also be noticed that these enact-
ments have ordinarily been interpreted to exclude the pleading of
law.3 This is a valid conclusion, for the legislatures have said thatfacts
should be alleged. Unless facts and law are identical the mandate is to
state facts, not law.
842 (Mont. 1932); State ex rd Young v. Osborn, 6o Neb. 415,83 N. W. 357 (1900);
Purdin v. Hancock, 67 Ore. z64, 135 Pac. 515 (1913); Electric Reduction Co. v.
Colonial Steel Co., 276 Pa. I8i, i2o Atl. ii6 (1923); Park v. Southern Ry. Co.,
78 S. C. 3o2, 58 S. E. 931 (1907); Cooper v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 78 S. C.
562, 59 S. E. 704 (,907); Jones v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corporation, 92 S.
C. 418, 75 S. E. 698 (1912); Meyer v. School Dist. No. 31, 4 S. D. 420, 57 N. W.
68 (1893); Bush v. Bush, 55 Utah 237, 184 Pac. 823 (1919); New Bank of Eau
Claire v. Kleiner, 112 Wis. 287, 87 N. W. io9o (i9oi); Weber v. Naas, 25o N. W.
436 (Wis. 1933).
8Cambers v. First Nat. Bank, i44 Fed. 717 (C. C. Ore. 19o6); In re McGraw,
254 Fed. 442 (N. D. W. Va. i918); Lucas v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
59 F. (2d) 617 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1932); Harrington v. Denny, 3 F. Supp. 584 (W. D.
Mo. 1933); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Smith, 94 Ark. 524, 127 S. W. 715 (1910);
Wood v. Drainage Dist. No. 2, 1io Ark. 416, i6i S. W. 1057 (1913); Wilkins v.
Stidger, 22 Cal. 231, 83 Am. Dec. 64 (1863); Ellis v. Central California Traction
Co., 37 Cal. App. 390, 174 Pac. 407 (I918); Peters v. Binnard, 17 P. (2d) 797 (Cal.
App. 1932); Fishback v. J. C. Forkner Fig Gardens Inc., 3o P. (2d) 586 (Cal. App.
1934); Bailey v. Bussing, 29 Conn. i (I86O); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207
Pac. 724 (1922); Logansport v. LaRose, 99 Ind. 117 (1884); Frain v. Burgett,
152 Ind. 55, 50 N. E. 873 (1898); Dailey v. State, 171 Ind. 646, 87 N. E. 4 (1909);
Euclid Ave. State Bank v. Nesbitt, 201 Iowa 5o6, 207 N. W. 761 (1926); Mitchell
Mill Remnant Corporation v. Long, 223 Ky. 242, 3 S. W. (2d) 639 (1928); Begley
v. Jones, 238 Ky. 239, 37 S. W. (2d) 44 (1931); Johnson v. Inter-Southern Life
Ins. Co., 244 Ky. 83, 5o S. W. (2d) 16 (1932); Garvey v. Wesson, i54 N. E. 516
(Mass. 1927); Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn. 456 (1862); Clark v. Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 28 Minn. 69, 9 N. W. 75 (1881); Kramer v. Kansas
City Power & Light Co., 311 Mo. 369,279 S. W. 43 (1926); Snow v. Ferril, 8 S. W.
(2d) IOO8 (Mo. 1928); Dyrcz v. Hammond Packing Co., 194 S. W. 761 (Mo. App.
1917); Totman v. Christopher, 237 S. W. 822 (Mo. App. 1922); Roberts v. Ander-
son, 254 S. W. 723 (Mo. App. 1923); American Central Life Ins. Co. v. Busch-
meyer, 65 S. W. (2d) 959 (Mo. App. 1933); Hensen v. Merton, 57 Mont. 231, 187
Pac. 1017 (1920); Brown v. Columbia Amusement Co., 6 P. (2d) 874 (Mont.
1931); Woodward v. State, 58 Neb. 598, 79 N. W. 164 (1899); International Har-
CAUSE OF ACTION
An innocuous statute, one says at first glance. Investigate, however,
the thousands of cases interpreting it and see what your idea of it will
be. Changed, I assure you. And why? Because the courts and lawyers
are, in multitudes of instances, at sea as to what are statements of
evidentiary facts, constitutive, final, operative, substantive, or ulti-
mate facts, and law. The result must be a large, incalculable yearly
loss of money in the form of attorneys' fees and the cost of running
courts as well as the wastage of a huge number of the working hours of
lawyers, the judiciary, and court officials, while an attempt is made to
discover whether or not the proper type of facts has been pleaded. A
few voices have, to some effect, cried out in the wilderness against the
imposition of this statute4 but, on the whole, the status existing before
they spoke has been retained. If this is true, a very definite, strenuous,
and concerted effort should be made to abolish the statute wherever it
exists and to provide in its place an enactment or rule of court which
will eliminate this unpardonable squandering of time and money.
The primary purpose of this discussion will be to show that lawyers
generally are unable to make the distinctions necessitated by the
statute under investigation, and to call attention to the change neces-
sary in the law to avoid the suggested loss. Since, moreover, I am well
aware of the inertia of legislatures when it comes to varying pro-
cedural law and know that it may be decades before the statute is cor-
rected, thus giving litigants and taxpayers a square deal in relation to
this matter, I have the temerity to state my own opinion as to whether
some of the allegations most frequently used in setting forth causes of
action are statements of law or fact. Also, as a basis for doing that, I
dare to reinvestigate the distinctions among law and the different
types of facts.
vester Co. of America v. Cameron, 25 Okla. 256, io5 Pac. 189 (I9O9); Hoover v.
Board of Com'rs of Garvin County, 157 Okla. 225, 13 P. (2d) 207 (1932); Dryden
v. Daly, 89 Ore. 218, 73 Pac. 667 (1918); Almada v. Vandecar, 94 Ore. 515,I85
Pac. 907 (i919); Pearson v. Richards, I06 Ore. 78, 211 Pac. 167 (x922); Jones v.
Atlantic Coast Lumber Corporation, supra note 2; Gunnison Irr. Co. v. Peterson,
280 Pac. 715 (Utah, 1929); Hoard v. Gilbert, 238 N. W.371 (Wis. 1931).
4See Book Review (1919) 33 HARv. L. REV. 326 by Dean Pound, approving the
attitude of Judge Works found on pages 44 and 45 of the latter's JURIDICAL RE-
FORM (I919). The judge there suggests doing away with the necessity of stating
facts constituting the cause of action. Dean Clark is, apparently, of the same opin-
ion when he says at page I5i of his work on CODE PLEADING (1928), "But at any
rate their [the New York codifiers'] ideal of pleading facts as it has worked out,
has proven probably the most unsatisfactory part of their reform." Professors
Sunderland and McCaskill seem to have bad the same idea in mind, for the pro-
vision in the new Illinois practice code dealing with the statement of one's cause of
action, with the wording of which they had much to do, steers clear of the form
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Is THERE ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAW AND FACTS?
As a foundation for our subsequent study, let us determine what, if
any, differences there are among law and various types of facts. Now,
there are some keen minds who believe there is no true dissimilarity
between fact and law. Thus, Prof. Cook says that there is no logical
distinction between statements which are grouped by courts as state-
ments of facts and conclusions of law. The slightest analysis will show,
he claims, that no pleading ever was, or ever will be, framed to carry
out the rule that only naked facts should be stated.6 With deference,
this last sentence is thought to be a great misstatement which is
readily disproved. Prof. Cook apparently means that it is impossible
to state a cause of action under the statute without alleging law. How
about merely stating the occurrences giving rise to actions of fraud
and negligence? Numerous other similar situations could be suggested.
However, if he means that law is always a part of one's cause of action,
I agree with him; for, to have a cause of action, one must have a legal
right, to which there is a correlative duty. The statute does not deny
this. It merely says one should state only that part of a cause of action
which relates to facts. The great Judge Mitchell.of Minnesota de-
clared that it may be impossible to define fact and law so as to dis-
tinguish them and that precedent and analogy are our only guides. 6
Dean Clark asserts, "The attempted distinction between facts, law
and evidence, viewed as anything other than a convenient distinction
of degree, seems philosophically and logically unsound. ' 7 These ideas
are the products of keen minds and to oppose them may seem heresy,
but one must be mentally honest. It is one thing to say it is folly to
force lawyers to plead facts, not law, since there is such a confusion of
ideas as to what is law and what is fact, but it is another thing to say
the difference does not exist. Moreover, there have been, and are,
other alert minds which believe that there is a distinction between law
and fact. Prof. Thayer surely believed in the distinction.8 We also find
Professors Michael and Adler are of that view, for they say, "Ques-
of statute which we are considering. The Illinois enactment reads as follows: "Sec.
33 (Form of pleadings) (i) All pleadings shall contain a plain and concise state-
ment of the pleader's cause of action, counterclaim, defense, or reply." Perhaps,
Prof. Isaacs has the same thing in mind when, in his article in (1922) 22 COL. L.
REV. i, he says that statutes should avoid reference to the distinction between
law and fact as a simple one.
5Gook, Statements of Fact in Code Pleading (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 416.
6Clark v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., supra note 3.
7CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 155.
8THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT CoMMON LAW (x898)
191-194.
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tions of fact and law are often intimately related and the relation is
often so close and intricate that it is not always profitable to attempt
sharply to separate them although it is always possible to make the
separation."
I, personally, believe that law and fact are distinguishable. So let us
be about our task of discovering that difference. First, we can best
turn our attention to what others have said on the subject, and then
personal conclusions can be expressed in the light of work that has
been previously done.
LAW
The great master of this subject was Prof. Thayer, but he wrote
primarily in respect to evidence and his words dealing with his defini-
tion of law must be rephrased in order that they may apply to plead-
ing. He says, "It is enough here to say, that in the sense now under
consideration (here the writer is dealing with law and fact in jury
trials) nothing is law that is not a rule or standard which it is the duty
of official tribunals to apply and enforce."' 0 As applied to our problem,
his statement must mean that only allegations relating to rules or
standards are averments of law. Prof. Cook claims that a conclusion of
law is a generic statement which can be made only after some legal
rule has been applied to some specific group of operative facts. Thus,
the statement that the defendant owes the plaintiff $500, standing by
itself, is usually treated as a mere conclusion of law. It is, in fact, the
conclusion of a logical argument. Whenever certain facts, a, b, c, etc.,
exist, B (defendant) owes A (plaintiff) $500; facts a, b, c, etc. exist,
therefore B owes A $5oo. This being so, when the bare statement is
made that B owes A $5oo, we may, if we wish, regard it as a statement
in generic form that all the facts necessary to create the legal duty to
pay money described by the word "owe" are true as between A and
B." Dean Ross appears to believe that usually an allegation of law
deals with legal rights and obligations to which stated events give
rise. 2 Prof. Isaacs tells us that what is fact today may be law tomor-
row. If a clause has been given an authoritative judicial interpreta-
tion, its meaning is a question of law, otherwise it is a question of
fact." Very little is said in the cases as to what constitutes an allega-
tion of law, but we do find courts saying, "Where the conclusion
'MICHAEL AND ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (1931) 24.
'
0THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW (1898)
192-193.
"Cook, Statements of Factin CodePleading (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 416.
12Ross, Minnesota Pleading as "Fact Pleading" (1929) 13 MINN. L. REv. 348.
Isaacs, The Law and the Facts (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. I.
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describes a legal status or condition or a legal offense it would ordina-
rily be termed a conclusion of law . . .. 14 Also, one judicial authority
declares, "We deduce the ultimate fact from certain probative facts
by a process of natural reasoning. We draw the inference or conclusion
of law by a process of artificial reasoning;...,"I The same ideamay be
expressed in the following words," 'Whether a finding is an ultimate
fact or conclusion of law depends upon whether it is reached by
natural reasoning or by the application of fixed rules of law.' That is,
where the ultimate conclusion can be arrived at only by applying a
rule of law, the result so reached embodies a conclusion of law and is
not a finding of fact."' 6
This is not a long list of authority to help us in our quest for a proper
solution of the meaning of "law" as it relates to the statute under con-
sideration. Even some of that is not directly in point. But it is helpful.
If by rules or standards is meant the manner in which the government
says we must live when in contact with our fellow men, Prof. Thayer's
definition properly defines most of the ground covered by "law", as
far as we are now interested in "law". This is true, for the government
(including the judicial, legislative, and executive branches thereof)
tells us, in laying down rules of conduct, what our rights and duties
are, and it is statements of rights and duties recognized by govern-
ments as existing and enforceable that comprise most of the legal
averments that are barred in pleading a cause of action. The same idea
is probably hinted at in the first set of cases cited. Of course, as is
pointed out by Prof. Cook, the fact that an allegation relating to such
rights and duties is based upon fact situations does not change it from
a statement of law to one of fact. Add to what has been said Prof.
Isaacs' idea that as soon as a word or phrase has been given an author-
itative judicial interpretation it becomes law and you have your
definition of "law" as it relates to the statute of which we are treating.
Surely, he is correct in claiming that, as soon as courts take over the
task of defining the meaning of words, those words become legal
terms-the court says they are going to make a standard of conduct
out of them. The suggestion that it is only when one uses artificial
reasoning that his conclusion relates to "law" as distinguished from
"fact" should be a severe indictment against the law, and such a
"'Reed v. Woodmen of the World, 94 Mont. 374,22 P. (2d) 819 (1933); State v.
Whitcomb, 94 Mont. 415, 22 P. (2d) 823 (1933); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Hallauer,
I31 Wis. 371, III N. W. 527 (1907).
'sLevins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 Pac. 16I (1886).
16Tesch v. Industrial Commission, 229 N. W. 194 (Wis. 1930). Also see Trav-
elers' Ins. Co. v. Hallauer, supra note I4; Village of Weyauwega v. Kramer, I8o
Wis. I68, 192 N. W. 452 (1923).
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standard should not be used to determine what is law. The courts
which say that a finding is one of law if it is reached by the application
of fixed rules of law do not help us, for they only use the term which
we are trying to define, that is, "law".
It is my conclusion that, in the final analysis, a statement of law is
averred as a part of a cause of action if it deals, to any extent, with
rights and duties which are enforced by the government, for such
rights and duties are the bone and sinew of that with which the legal
arms of the government deal. The only other instance when law is
stated occurs when a word or phrase is set forth, the definition of
which has been taken over by the judiciary.
FAcTS IN GENERAL
Now, to discover the meaning of "facts". Our present search for
authorities is to be more fruitful than it was when we were dealing
with "law". Let us again see what Prof. Thayer says. We find, "The
fundamental conception of 'fact' is that of a thing as existing, or be-
ing true. It is not limited to what is tangible or visible, or in any way
the object of sense; things invisible, mere thoughts; intentions, fancies
of the mind, when conceived of as existing or being true, are conceived
of as facis... All inquiries into the truth, the reality, the actuality of
things are inquiries into the fact about them. Nothing is a question of
fact which is not a question of the existence, reality, truth of some-
thing; of the rei veritas ... it is no test of a question of fact that it
should be ascertainable without reasoning and the use of the 'adjudg-
ing' faculty; much must be conceived of as fact which is invisible to
the senses, and ascertainable only in this way.., the right inference
or conclusion, in point of fact, is itself matter of fact,.. .,7 Dean Ross
concludes that "fact" generally means an event-something that took
place, but it may refer to an existing condition. 18 Much the same ideas
are expressed by a judge who says, "A 'fact', as the term is used in
legal proceedings, is an event, a thing done or said, an act or action
which is the subject of testimony. The condition or state of mind at a
given time is a fact. If any emotion is felt, as joy, grief, or anger, the
feeling is a fact. If the operations of the mind produce an effect, as
knowledge, skill, intention, this effect on the mind is a fact. When the
mental processes lead up to and produce a desire or intention to do a
certain thing, such a state of mind is a fact.'"A New York court" de-
17THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW (1898)
191-194.
lSRoss, Minnesota Pleading as "Fact Pleading" (1929) 13 MINN. L. REV. 348.
*'Barr v. Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co., io Ind. App. 433, 37 N. E. 814 (i894).
20Fowler-Curtis Co. v. Dean, 2o3 App. Div. 317, 196 N. Y. Supp. 750 (3rd
Dept. 1922).
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elares, "A fact, according to Webster, 'is a thing done;... an actual
happening in time or space; any event mental or physical.' A misre-
presentation of one's intention at the time is a misrepresentation of an
existing fact. As Lord Bowen once said: 'The state of a man's mind is
as much a fact as the state of his digestion."' Additional courts deal-
ing only with allegations of intention or will have said that they have
to do with fact.21 The same has been asserted of averments relating to
knowledge.2 Again, judges have said, "... where, on the other hand,
the conclusion describes a condition or status not represented or
designated by some definite legal term or rule, it will ordinarily be a
conclusion of fact."21
Michael and Adler assert, "A fact is any determinate entity which
has a determined place in the order of existence." 24
A still different test is given us when it is claimed that, "Evidentiary
facts are acquired by the sense of sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell,
and muscular resistance .... "2 Again, in Hulings v. Hulings Lumber
Co.,2 16 the court says, "A fact, as distinguished from law, may be taken
as that out of which the point of law arises, that which is asserted to be
or not to be and is to be presumed or proved to be or not to be, for the
purpose of applying or refusing to apply a rule of law."
Then too, it is statedin Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Hallauer ' "W h ere,...,
the conclusion describes a condition or status not represented or desig-
nated by some legal term or rule, it will ordinarily be a conclusion of
fact."
Finally, to determine what a fact is, it is suggested that one should
look to the conception of the mind of a person of common under-
standing.28
These ideas are, for the most part, of real value to us. There is little
to object to as far as the majority of them go. One difficulty with the
21Kane v. Eastman, 288 Pac. 819 (Cal. App. 1930); Barr v. Chicago, St. L. &
P. R. R. Co., supra note i9; Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hart, 21 Ind. App.
130, 28 N. E. 218 (189i); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y. x85,
123 N. E. 148 (i919). Cf. Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. Cheeks, io Ga. App. 411, 73
S. E. 545 (1912).
22Hall v. Montgomery, 208 Ala. 383, 94 So. 363 (1922); Heinemann v. Barfield,
136 Ark. 456,207 S. W. 58 (1918); Farmers' Life Ins. Co. v. Ignacio State Bank,
85 Colo. 46, 272 Pac. iii6 (1928); Cousins v. Wilson, 94 Okla. 29, 220 Pac. 923
(1923); Heitkemper v. Schmeer, 281 Pac. 169 (Ore. 1929).
nReed v. Woodmen of the World, supra note i4; State v. Whitcomb, supra
note i4; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Hallauer, supra note 14.
24MICLAEL AND ADLER, TE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (1931) I.
2Bjelka v. M. & Z. Mizeson Realty Co., 260 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1932).
",38 W. Va. 351, I8 S. E. 620 (1893). 2 Supra note 14.
28D. L. Adams Co. v. Federal Glass Co., i8o Ind. 576, 2o3 N. E. 414 (1913).
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statement by Professors Michael and Adler is in discovering what is
meant by "entity". If it is to cover the field at all adequately it must
refer to more than existing things. It probably was meant to include
happenings and existences, such as mental states. If it goes further
and encompasses situations dealing with rights and duties enforceable
by governmental agencies, it is too broad. Why the distinction was
made in Bjelka v. M. & Z. Mizeson Realty Co.2' between evidentiary
and other facts is not known, for surely one can discover by sense cer-
tain ultimate facts as well as evidentiary facts. The declaration in
Hulings v. Hulings Lumber CoY° properly gives us a new angle to the
meaning of facts, and is only deficient in using the term "law" without
giving us a hint of what "law" is. The same may be said of the excerpt
from Traveers' Ins. Co. v. Hallauer.3' The holding in D. L. Adams Co.
v. Federal Glass Co., 2 which applies the test of "the mind of one of
common understanding," cannot be approved, because such a mind is
not trained to think in the terms of law and fact. It considers only the
occurrences back of such allegations as "ownership", which, as will be
shown, avers law. Doing that, it would unhesitatingly say, if my ex-
periments in questioning laymen as to these matters amount to any-
thing, that, when one says he owns property, he states a fact. Now,
when lawyers, and good ones, too, cannot agree on what is law and
what is fact, we will err in relying on "the mind of one of common
understanding."
What, then, is "fact" as that term relates to the pleading of a cause
of action? There are different ways of looking at the matter. An easy,
though to some a very unsatisfactory approach, would be to say that
that is "fact" which does not deal somewhat, or wholly, with rights
and duties enforceable through governmental agencies or with terms
whose definition has been taken over by the courts. If one knows when
a statement concerns such rights and duties, or is so defined, he is
master of the situation. It will be helpful, however, to go further.
Usually facts are discovered through the five senses, and one can say
with assurance that, when a statement is made relating solely to some-
thing that can be so ascertained, a fact has been alleged. But other
expressions are within the realm of fact. An averment that anything
exists or occurs, though the truth of such an allegation cannot be
determined by the senses, is a declaration of fact as long as it in no
way deals with the rights and duties already mentioned. The clearest
example of such a situation is a mental condition. Thus, statements
that one thinks a thing is so, that he intends to act in a particular way,
2'See supra note 25. 31See supra note 26.
2'See supra note 27. 3See supra note 28.
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that he grieves, is joyful, well pleased, or angry are all allegations of
fact. That reasoning is involved in determining the truth or falsity of a
statement does not prove it to be an averment of law, for the process
of drawing inferences and reaching conclusions from a consideration
of data or premises must go on in almost every case when we say our
senses tell us a certain thing is true.
EVIDENTIARY FACTS
Our next task is to analyze "evidence" and "constitutive, final,
operative, substantive, or ultimate facts," to find out what each is,
and to determine their differences, if any.
"An 'evidentiary' fact is one that furnishes evidence of the exist-
ence of some other fact." 3  Such a fact is one which, on being ascer-
tained, affords some logical basis, not conclusive, for inferring some
other fact. Another suggestion is that evidentiary or probative facts
are those tending to show that operative facts exist.35 Again, it is said
that evidential facts "are those upon which a material issue cannot be
taken, and from which the issuable facts may be inferred." 36 Much the
same idea is expressed in the statement that evidentiary facts are not
those essential to the cause of action.3
ULTIMATE FACTS
It will be more satisfactory to discuss all types of facts together
than to consider them separately, so let us at this time also look at
the authorities treating of "ultimate facts".
"An 'ultimate fact' is the final resulting effect which is reached
by processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts."38
"Ultimate facts are nothing more than issuable, constitutive facts
essential to the statement of the cause of action." 39
uOregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Inv. Co., 94 Ore. 349, 184 Pac. 487
(1919). In accord: Maeder Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, lo9 Ore. 562, 220 Pac.
155 (1923).
34HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) 32-33.
5johnson v. Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co., 244 Ky. 83, 50 S. W. (2d) 16 (1932);
PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1932) 398; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed.
1929) §§ 420 and 426.
-"Nichols v. Nichols, supra note 2.
3tDanerhirsch v. Great Eastern Casualty Co., 16o N. Y. Supp. IOI5 (1916).
38Oregon Home Builders v. Montgomery Ins. Co., supra note 33. In accord:
Ellis v. Central California Traction Co., supra note 3; Bjelka v. M. & Z. Mizeson
Realty Co., supra note 25. See also Russell Grain Co. v. Wabash R. R. Co., 114
Mo. App. 488, 89 S. W. 908 (I9O5).
39Masser v. Musser, 281 Mo. 649, 221 S. W. 46 (1920). In accord: Nichols v.
Nichols, supra note 2; Johnson v. Johnson, supra note 2; Meyer v. School District
No. 31, 4 S. D. 420, 57 N. W. 68 (1893).
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Other utterances on this subject should be noticed. An ultimate fact,
it has been said, is frequently an inference and conclusion from many
evidentiary facts and is, in a sense, a mixed conclusion of law and
fact.40 Phillips has claimed that operative or ultimate facts are those
which enter into and create jural relations between persons. They
operate to create these rights and obligations and are thus called
operative facts.4' The same thought is expressed by Dean Ross who
says an "operative fact" means substantially an event which creates a
legal right or obligation or which changes somebody's rights or obliga-
tions.4 Another authority asserts, "Whether a finding is an ultimate
fact or a conclusion of law depends upon whether it is reached by
natural reasoning or by application of the artificial rules of law. ' 43
Again, we find this statement, "The principal and perhaps the only
way to determine what is ultimate fact is by precedent." 44
What of the soundness of these authorities? If one is to distinguish
between evidentiary and ultimate facts, those are right who say the
former go to prove the latter, since that which is evidencemakes mani-
fest and tends to furnish proof of something else. As evidence is not to
be pleaded, authorities claiming that evidential facts cannot be put in
issue are correct, for only pleadable, pleaded facts can properly be at-
tacked. This being true, ultimate facts (also known as constitutive,
final, operative, or substantive facts) must be those which are issuable
and to be pleaded. Further, as Phillips has well stated, they are those
which are relied upon to show the existence of enforceable rights and
obligations. On the other hand, they do not prove any other fact. If,
as is claimed to be the case, evidentiary and ultimate facts are dis-
tinguishable, one should not have to rely upon precedent to discover
what an ultimate fact is, for that can be done by the application of a
premise, a principle of law. Moreover, if precedent were the sole load-
star by which ultimate facts could be distinguished, how would one
ever get a start in his search, for the court must act before any prece-
dent exists?
The authorities having been stated and criticized, full personal
opinions having been given as to the meaning of evidentiary and ulti-
mate facts and of law, may I be permitted briefly to recapitulate?
Let us draw a circle and premise that it contains all possible allega-
tions that could ever be stated in any cause of action. Then let us
41Crane v. Schaefer, I4O IIl. App. 647 (I9O8).
4PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1932) § 398.
"Ross, Minnesota Pleading as "Fact Pleading" (1929) 13 MINN. L. Rxv. 348.
OTravelers' Ins. Co. v. Hallauer, supra note 14.
'ACity & County of Denver v. Bowen, supra note 2.
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draw two more circles, one within the other, both inside of the outer
circle. Let the space between the outer and middle circles represent all
possible statements of law, that between the inner and middle circles
all possible statements of ultimate fact, and that within the inner
circle all possible statements of evidentiary facts. The facts, as dis-
tinguished from law, will deal only with existences, conditions, and
occurrences which in no way have to do with enforceable rights and
duties. The evidentiary facts will prove other facts, the broadest of
such evidentiary facts proving ultimate facts, which, in turn, will
never prove facts, but will be the outposts of facts from which the
proper governmental authorities will determine what, if any, rights
and duties exist which the state will enforce.
SPEcIFIc ALLEGATIONS
It is now meet to examine a few of the more important allegations
which appear when attempts are made to state causes of action. First,
the authorities will be stated and then personal opinions will be given.
Initially, will be considered thephrase "according to law" or its equiv-
alent "duly". The great weight of authority is to the effect that this
phrase and word deal with law.45 But there are several decisions that
appear to be the other way.41 The usual result seems clearly to be the
45Porter v. Coble, 246 Fed. 244, 158 C. C. A. 404 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917); Ro-
maniuk v. Locke, 3 F. Supp. 529 (S. D. N. Y. 1932); Woodson v. Wilson, I44 So.
I22 (Ala. App. 1932); Moran v. Bonynge, 157 Cal. 295, 107 Pac. 312 (191o); Craw-
ford v. Felkey, 73 Colo. 444,216 Pac. 520 (1923); Rapelye v. Bayley, 3 Conn. 438,
8 Am. Dec. 199 (1820); Wilhner v. Newsom, 149 So. 3 (Fla. 1933); Nightingale v.
City of Brunswick, 29 Ga. App. 184, 114 S. E. 584 (1922); Weed v. Idaho Copper
Co., ioP. (2d) 613 (Idaho, 1932); Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 335 IIl. Ii, 166 N. E. 504
(1929); Temple v. State, 185 Ind. 139, 113 N. E. 233 (1916); Taylor County Farm
Bureau v. Board of Sup'rs of Taylor County, 252 N. W. 498 (Iowa, 1934); Houser
v. Smith, 8o Kan. 26o, IOI Pac. Iooi (19o9); Hoskins v. Helton, 252 Ky. 616, 67
S. W. (2d) 975 (1934); Mann v. Farmers' Exchange Bank of Gallatin, 50 S. W.
(2d) 146 (Mo. App. 1932); Clark v. Demers, 254 Pac. 162 (Mont. 1927); Wood-
ward v. State, 58 Neb. 598, 79 N. W. 164 (1899); Samuel Kronman & Co. v. Public
Nat. Bank of New York, 218 App. Div. 624,218 N. Y. Supp. 616 (ist Dept. 1927);
American Exch. Nat. Bank v. Segroves, 166 N. C. 6o8, 82 S. E. 947 (191o); Zim-
merman v. Hoss, 23 P. (2d) 897 (Ore. 1933).
4Brown v. Carbonate Bank of Leadville, 34 Fed. 776 (C. C. Colo. 1888); Breck-
inridge County v. McCracken, 6z Fed. 191, 9 C. C. A. 442 (C. C. A. 6th, 1894);
Knox v. Rivers Bros., 17 Ala. App. 63o, 88 So. 33 (1920); Caswell v. Copper River
& N. W. Ry., 4 Alaska 709 (1913); Los Angeles County v. Delahunt, 279 Pac. 187
(Cal. App. 1929); Ley v. Babcock, 5 P. (2d) 620 (Cal. App. 1931); Brannin v.
Gleason, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 109 (1892); Curtiss v. Livingston, 36 Minn. 380, 31
N. W. 357 (1887); DeRuntz v. St. Louis Police Relief Ass'n, 18o Mo. App. I, 162
S. W. 1053 (1913); Freeman v. City of Huron, io S. D. 368, 73 N. W. 26o (1897).
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correct one, since, without question, the words involve an imposed
duty to act in a certain fashion.
The terms "legal" and "illegal" are so prevalently treated as legal
averments that it seems useless to set forth a long list of authorities to
that effect. However, it is interesting to find it stated that it is proper
to allege that the plaintiff was a "legal constable." 47 Of course, those
words are as purely legal as could be possible, for they treat most
decidedly of rights and duties. The same can with assurance be said of
"lawful" and "unlawful", yet one finds it claimed that an allegation
that salaries were "excessive and unlawful" is a statement "of mixed
conclusions of fact and law, the ultimate of which is, in a broad sense,
a conclusion of fact, and consequently may be pleaded according to"
its legal effect. 48 'Entitled to" is most often said to state a bare legal
conclusion,49 but there are contrary holdings. 0 Again, the majority
ruling is correct, as the phrase could not more definitely speak of
rights. On the other hand, we have the expression "subject to." Once
more there is a split of authority.8 ' Why this is so is quite beyond my
powers of comprehension, for, as certainly as "entitled to" is saturated
with the idea of "right", these words are pregnant with the thought of
"duty."
A plurality of courts say that "agent" alleges a legal conclusion,-
47Culver v. Sparkman, 149 So. 877 (Ala. App. 1933).
48Thauer v. Gaebler, 232 N. W. 563 (Wis. 193o). Perhaps a similar idea is ex-
pressed in Nance v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry. Co., 35 S. C. 307, 14 S. E. 629 (1892).
4 Moran v. Bonynge, 157 Cal. i95, 107 Pac. 312 (igio); Street v. Sederburg, 41
Colo. 128, 92 Pac. 29 (19o7); Garner v. McCullough, 48 Mo. 318 (187); Sheridan
v. Jackson, 72 N. Y. 170 (1878); Burdick v. Chesebrough, 94 App. Div. 532, 88
N. Y. Supp. 13 (3rd Dept. 19o4).
50 McCauley v. Gilmer, 2 Mont. 202 (x874); Farmers' & Fruit-Growers' Bank v.
Davis, 93 Ore. 655, 184 Pac. 275 (1919).
51To the effect that "subject to" is a statement of law, see Wright v. Board of
Sup'rs. of Sonoma County, 190 Cal. 382, 212 Pac. 921 (1923); Bistor v. McDon-
ough, 348 Ill. 624, I81 N. E. 417 (1932); Ridpath v. Heller, 46 Mont. 586, 129
Pac. 1054 (1913). Contra: L. L. & G. R. R. Co. v. Leahy, 12 Kan. 124 (1873);
Boynton v. Faulk County, 7 S. D. 423,64 N. W. 518 (1895).
'Calumet & Hecla Mining Co. v. Equitable Trust Co., 275 Fed. 552 (S. D.
N. Y. I919); Amalgamated Royalty Oil Corporation v. He-me, 282 Fed. 750
(C. C. A. 8th, 1922); Schotis v. North Coast Stevedoring Co., 24 F. (2d) 591
(W. D. Wash. 1927); Coen v. Watson, 287 Pac. 525 (Cal. App. 193o); People v.
Chicago Rys. Co., 270 Ill. 278, 11o N. E. 394 (1915); Premier Motor Mfg. Co.
v. Tilford, 61 Ind. App. 164, iii N. E. 645 (1916); Tuck v. Harmon, 151 So. 803
La. App. 1934); Lovell v. Marshall, 162 Minn. i8, 202 N. W. 64 (1925); Seymour
.Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank of New York City, io8 Misc. 138, I77 N. Y.
upp. 493 (1919); Ottmanv. Nixon-Nirdlinger, 3o Pa. 234, 151 Atl. 879 (1930);
orne Zodlogical Arena Co. v. City of Dallas, 45 S. W. (2d) 714 (Tex. Civ. App.
931); Hamp v. Universal Auto Co., 24 P. (2d) 77 (Wash. 1933).
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while a few are contrary minded." Courts generally have taken over
the job of defining the word, hence it has properly become a legal
term. They have done the same with the language "within the scope
of employment," therefore it should be deemed a legal averment.
Most of the judiciary is of that opinion," but some think otherwise."
"Converted" has raised controversies. Of the few cases discovered,
a bare majority have held that it is a mere legal conclusion." Of the
remaining cases, one said it alleged a fact whichcould be described as
"composite." 57 Another said that to allege, "The books of said busi-
ness showed that the defendant had taken from said business and
wrongfully converted to his own use the sum of $1,299," was to state
the existence of evidence.5 8 The majority holding must be right, for
here we have another instance of a term defined by the courts.
There are many cases holding that statements that there was, or
53Ivey v. Railway Fuel Co., 211 Ala. 10, 99 So. 177 (1924); Cullinan v. Mer-
cantile Trust Co. of California, 252 Pac. 647 (Cal. App. 1926-7); Bryce v. Louis-
ville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 73 Hun 233,25 N. Y. Supp. 1043,57 N. Y. St. Rep. 116
(1893); Beckham v. Cayton, 262 S. W. 84o (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
64National Park Bank of New York v. Louisville & N. R. Co., i99 Ala. 192, 74
So. 69 (1917); Burge v. Scarbrough, 211 Ala. 377, ioo So. 653 (1924); Reed v.
Trinity Drilling Co., 17o Ark. 657, 28o S. W. 639 (1926); Idemoto v. Scheidecker,
193 Cal. 653, 226 Pac. 922 (1924); People v. Beach, 49 Colo. 516, 113 Pac. 513,
37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 873 (1911); People v. Pacific Surety Co., 5o Colo. 273, 109 Pac.
961, ANN. CAs. 1912C 577 (i9IO); Friedlander v. Rapley, 38 App. D. C. 208
(1912); Clark v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 42 App. D. C. 444 (1914);
Southern Grocery Stores Inc. v. Childs, 174 Ga. 888, 164 S. E. 766 (1932); Cahill
v. Plumbers' Gas and Steam Fitters' and Helpers' Local 93, 238 Ill. App. 123
(1926); Indianapolis & G. R. T. Co. v. Foreman, 162 Ind. 85, 69 N. E. 669, 1O2
Am. St. Rep. 185 (z9o4); Jones v. Van Bever, 164 Ky. 80, 174 S. W. 795, L. R. A.
1915E 172 (1915); Hale v. Gilliland Oil Co., 151 La. 5oo, 91 So. 853 (1922); Valley
v. Clay, 151 La. 710, 92 So. 308 (1922); Snyder v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 6o
Mo. 413 (1875); Bolingv. Clinton Cotton Mills, 161 S. E. 195 (S. C. 1931); Waaler
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 18 S. D. 42o, ioo N. W. 1097, 7o L. R. A. 731, 112
Am. St. Rep. 794 (19o4); Wall v. Royal Indemnity Co., 299 S. W.319 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1927).
nMay v. Farrell, 271 Pac. 789 (Cal. App. 1928); Savannah Electric Co. v.
McCants, 13o Ga. 741, 61 S. E. 713 (19o8); Riordan v, Thompson-Starrett Co.,
204 Ill. App. 488 (1917); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. 116,
94 N. E. 793 (1911); Southern Surety Co. v. Weaver, 273 S. W. 838 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1925).
6'Sebastian County Coal & Mining Co. v. Fidelity Fuel Co., 310 Mo. I58, 274
S. W. 774 (1925); Givens, Headly & Co. v. Jordan, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 258 (1891);
Day v. Duckworth, 17 Misc. 3o5, 4o N. Y. Supp. 378 (1896); Newton v. Living-
ston County Trust Co., 231 App. Qiv. 355,247 N. Y. Supp. 121 (4th Dept. 1931).
67Duggan v. Wright, 157 Mass. 228, 32 N. E. 159 (1892). In accord, in effect:
Livingston v. Lovgren, 27 Wash. 1O2, 67 Pac. 599 (19o2).
58Robinson v. Stanley, 61 Misc. 6o8, 114 N. Y. Supp. z62 (1909).
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was not, "adequate consideration" in a particular instance are but
allegations of legal conclusions. 9 On the other hand, we find it claimed
that "for a valuable consideration" is so commonly used, and has such
a well known meaning in commercial and legal usage, that it is illogi-
cal io say that it expresses a legal conclusion rather than a statement
of fact.60 Again, it is directly said that those words state an ultimate
fact.6 ' Which view is right? The answer is found in the reply to the
question, who tells us what "consideration" is-laymen or the judici-
ary? The clear answer is the latter; thus "consideration" becomes a legal
averment. The argument that it is illogical to say that the term "for a
valuable consideration" states a legal conclusion because it is com-
monly used and has a well known meaning, is untenable. The court
has the power, by assuming the duty of explaining an expression, to
turn what has been an allegation of fact into one of law. Moreover,
consideration has not such a well known meaning as the court would
make one think. To discover this, all one need do is to read the cases
attempting to explain that word. Of course, as Dean Pound said,
while he was a commissioner in Nebraska, when the nature and cir-
cumstances of a conveyance are fully set forth, and its purpose dis-
closed, an allegation in connection with these statements that a note
was executed without consideration is not open to objection. 2 The
only exception that could legitimately be taken to his opinion is that
he suggests that "consideration" should, under such circumstances,
be treated as a fact. However, from the rest of the opinion it seems
doubtful that he meant that, as he appears to say that "considera-
tion" standing by itself would be an averment of law. If it is to be so
treated under such circumstances, it should be deemed a useless alle-
gation of law when pleaded after facts showing the existence or non-
existence of consideration. The setting forth of such facts will not
change "consideration" from'a word stating law to one alleging fact.
One of the most discussed set of words, with which the statute now
5 Some of these cases are Meyer v. Bloch, 139 Ala. 174,35 So. 705 (i9O3); Magee
v. Magee, 174 Cal. 276, 162 Pac. 1023, L. R. A. 1917D 629, ANN. CAs. T9x8B 227
(1917); Peters v. Binnard, 17 P. (2d) 797 (Cal. App. 1932); Winne v. Colorado
Springs Co., 3 Colo. i55 (1877); Higgins v. Gose, i44 Ky. 123, 137 S. W. 1038
(1911); Harris v. Rayner, 8 Pick. 541 (Mass. 1829); German Bank v. Mulhall,
8 Mo. App. 558 (i88o); California Packing Corporation v. Kelly Storage & Dis-
tributing CO., 228 N. Y. 49, 126 N. E. 269 (1920); Cole v. Levy, 212 App. Div. 84,
2o8 N. Y. Supp. 481 (3rd Dept. 1925).
6St. Lawrence County Nat. Bank of Canton v. Watkins, 153 App. Div. 551,
138 N. Y. Supp. II6 (3rd Dept. 1912).
61Royal Bank of Canada v. Williams, 220 App. Div. 603, 222 N. Y. Supp. 425
(ist Dept. 1927).
62Bennett v. Bennett, 65 Neb. 432, 91 N. W. 4o9 (19o2).
200 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
being considered deals, consists of "negligence", "negligent", and
"negligently." Do they relate to law or fact? The courts have given
every conceivable answer to that question. Some have said that
"negligence", standing alone, alleges law, 3 a smaller number have
claimed it avers fact." We, also, find this statement, "It would be, as
we think, better practice if the plaintiff in his petition were required to
set out, at least in a general way, te grounds of negligence com-
plained of,... But our rather indefinite system of pleading in this
class of cases has been followed so long and is so well understood by
the profession that it would create much confusion as well as injustice
and delay to make any radical changes in it."" The answer to such
talk is clear. A statute which says "facts" should be stated is not
"indefinite." The instant that enactment became law any uncertain
practice of prior days was abandoned, and any court that seeks to
retain the old procedure is improperly'legislating. The saddest thing
about this statement is that the court thinks the practice is defective,
and yet, with a statute to aid it in enforcing what the court believes is
a preferable mode of pleading, it bows to the ancient, a thing no court
should do under such circumstances. Another member of the judiciary
63King v. City of Beaumont, 296 Fed. 531 (E. D. Tex. I924), Stokes v. Great
Southern Lumber Co., 21 F. (2d) i85 (S. D. Miss. 1927); Rosselott v. Road Im-
provement Dist. No. i of Lawrence County, 141 Ark. 8, 2x5 S. W. 89i ('919);
Catlett v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 56 Colo. 463, 139 Pac. 14 (1914); Atlanta, K. &
N. Ry. Co. v. Gardner, 12 Ga. 82, 49 S. E. 818 (1905); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L.
Ry. Co. v. Morrey, 172 Ind. 513, 88 N. E. 932 (19o9); S. K. Jones Const. Co. v.
Hendley, 224 Ky. 83, 5 S. W. (2d) 482 (1928); Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Ro-
mero, xo La. App. 796, 122 So. 288 (1929); State to use of Jeter v. Schwind Quarry
Co., 97 Md. 696, 55 Atl. 366 (1903); Horton v. Lincoln County, I6 Miss. 813, 77
So. 796 (i918); Mitchell v. Westport Hotel Operating Co., i9 S. W. (2d) 528
(Mo. App. i929); Fusselman v. Yellowstone Valley Land & Irrigation Co., 53
Mont. 254, 163 Pac. 473, ANN. CAS. 1918B 42o (1917); Bray v. Cove Irr. Dist.,
86 Mont. 562, 284 Pac. 539 (I93O); Walsh v. Van Ameringen-Haebler, 231 App.
Div. 653,248 N. Y. Supp. i (ist Dept. 1931); Whitehead v. Carolina Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 1go N. C. 197, 129 S. E. 602 (1925); Johnson v. Stilwell, 9o Ore.
211, 176 Pac. 123 (i918); Wright v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., i1o Va. 670, 66
S. E. 848,25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 972, I9 ANN. CAs. 439 (I91O); Wilson v. Guyandotte
Timber Co., 70 W. Va. 6o2, 74 S. E. 870 (1912); Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co.,
159 Wis. 83, 149 N. W. 760 (i914).
"St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Fancher, I Ala. App. 295,55 So. 458 (1911); May v.
Farrell, supra note 55; McIntyre v. Gritton, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 694 (1884); Clark
v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., supra note 3; Rueter v. Terminal R.
Ass'n, of St. Louis, 261 S. W. 713 (Mo. App. 1924); Johnson v. American Smelt-
ing & Refining Co., 80 Neb. 255, x16 N. W. 517 (x9o8); Robinson v. Ocean S. S.
Co.'of Savannah, Ga., 162 App. Div. 169, 147 N. Y. Supp. 310 (ist Dept. 1914);
Levinev. Carrell, 68 S. W. (2d) 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
63Hall v. Mengel Box Co., 16o Ky. 586, x69 S. W. 985 (1914).
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says that "without proper and ordinary care and prudence, and with-
out due examination, inquiry and proof" is a conclusioi of fact, as it
embraces the sum of all the evidence necessary to establish it, and is
sufficient. If all details are set forth, the complaint alleges evidence
and that is improper." Now, wherein would stating those facts which
are the elements of negligence, such as averring the manner of driving
an automobile, be an allegation of evidence? Those facts would riot be
used to prove the existence of other facts, but would merely allow the
court to see that the component parts of a negligent act existed, that
is, they would show, and only show, that someone failed to act as a
reasonable person should act under the circumstances. Many judges
who have failed to go so far as to say that "negligence" by itself is
sufficient, have declared that one may correctly plead that another
did a named act negligently, omitting all further statement as to how
the deed was done.6 7 One of the proponents of this idea says that
negligence may consist of the negligent doing of acts otherwise law-
ful. It results, he adds, from the simplest logic, that, when the claim
arises from such cause, the pleader should be allowed to state the fact
of negligent performance on which he relies. In doing so, he states a
substantive, issuable fact. The pleader does not rely on the act. The
legal wrong, the court continues, does not arise from that but from the
color and character which the qualifying language gives it. Hence,
general allegations of negligence should be allowed as qualifying an
act otherwise lawful.6 8 So the court thinks it isn't the act on which the
one asserting a claim must rely in convincing the legal arbiter that he
has a cause of action, but that his right to recover rests on color. What
he means, of course, is that he doesn't merely rely on the fact that the
alleged wrongdoer did a certain kind of thing such as drive an automo-
6Ayers v. Russell, 50 Hun 282,3 N. Y. Supp. 338,20 N. Y. St. Rep. 323 (1888).
67Tatum v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 253 Fed. 898, 165 C. C. A. 378 (C. C. A.
5th, 1918); Doullut &Williams v. Hoffman, 204 Ala. 33, 86 So. 73 (1920); Gros-
setti v. Sweasey, 176 Cal. 793, 169 Pac. 687 (1918); Adams Exp. Co. v. Aldridge,
20 Colo. App. 74, 77 Pac. 6 (I9O4); Western & A. R. R. v. Grover, I55 S. E. 500
(Ga. App. 1930); Nickey v. Steuder, 164 Ind. 189, 73 N. E. 117 (igo5); Murray v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. C. of Ky.,. 139 Ky. 379, 115 S. W. 821 (I9O9); Philadelphia,
B. & W. R. Co. v. Allen, 102 Md. I io, 62 Atl. 245 (19o5); Gayle v. Missouri Car &
Foundry Co., 177 Mo. 427,76 S. W. 987 (1903); Zichler v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., 59 S. W. (2d) 654 (Mo. 1933); Thompson v. Shanley, 17 P. (2d) IO85 (Mont.
1933); Jones v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 12 N. D. 343, 97 N. W. 535 (1903);
Merriam v. Hamilton, 64 Ore. 476, 130 Pac. 4o6 (1913); Freedman v. Denhalter
Bottling Co., 54 Utah 513, 182 Pac. 843 (I919); Zimmerman v. Auerbach, 17 P.
(2d) 251 (Utah, 1932); Parker v. Boston & M. R. R., 84 Vt. 329, 79 Atl. 865
(1911).
68HiU v. Fairhaven & W. R. Co., 75 Conn. 177,52 Atl. 725 (1902)
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bile, but that the claimant can recover only if it was driven in a cer-
tain way. That is correct, but, still, the injured person relies on an act
or acts, such as driving an automobile at an excessive rate of speed,
and the driving and the rate of speed cannot possibly be divoiced one
from the other, for, at the same time he drives, he drives in a particu-
lar way. There is but a single occurrence. If he relies on any of it, he
depends on all of it to obtain a judgment. Several decisions directly
oppose the view just discussed. 9
In a few jurisdictions one finds holdings that definitely demand a
statement of facts showing the existence of a duty on the part of the
actor to the claimant not to do the act resulting in harm, as well an
allegation of the negligent doing of something.70 These cases can
scarcely be thought to add anything new, as, in any instance, words
must be asserted which show the existence of such an obligation.
There are some adjudications which, on their face, appear to go still
further. They seem to declare that, if one alleges facts which disclose a
duty on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff not to do a certain
thing, the only other statement that the claimant needs to set forth is
general negligence on the defendant's part.7 ' If this is so, we have the
rule already stated to the effect that "negligence", without more,
sufficiently alleges lack of due care. It is believed, however, that these
cases are not intended to establish this rule, for they all come from
states in which the law is that one must at least aver that a particular
act was negligently done.
Another school of thought, closely akin to that which says "negli-
gence" states an ultimate fact, is sponsored by those who assert that
69Northern Alabama R. Co. v. Mitchell, 205 Ala. 448, 88 So. 558 (1921); Strat-
ton's Independence v. Sterrett, 51 Colo. 17, 117 Pac. 351 (19Ii); Louisville & N.
R. Co. v. Barnwell, 131 Ga. 791, 63 S. E. 5oi (i9O9); Payne v. Moore, 31 Ind. App.
360, 67 N. E. 1005 (19o3); Cooley v. Killingsworth, 228 N. W. 880 (Iowa, 193o);
Bourgoyne v. Louisiana Public Utilities Co., 152 So. 15o (La. App. 1934); Phelps
v. Board of Com'rs of Howard County, 117 Md. 175, 82 Atl. 1o58 (1912); Kra-
merv. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 311 Mo. 369,279 S. W. 43 (1926); Peerrot
v. Mt. Morris Bank, 12o App. Div. 247, lO4 N. Y. Supp. lO45 (Ist Dept. 19o7);
Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Conn, 3o S. W. (2d) 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Baker v.
Butterworth, ii9 Va. 402, 89 S. E. 849, L. R. A. I916F, 1287 (1916); Moen v.
Madison Rys. Co., 225 N. W. 821 (Wis. 1929).70Macke v. Sutterer, 224 Ala. 681, 141 So. 65I (1932); Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Holiday, 73 Fla. 269, 74 So. 479 (I916); Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co.
v. Arnott, i89 Ind. 350, 126 N. E. 13 (1920); Consolidated Coach Corporation v.
Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S. W. (2d) i6 (1932).71Southern Ry. Co. v. Arnold, 162 Ala. 570, 50 So. 293 (191o); Mauney v. Elec-
tric Const. Co., 21o Ala. 554,98 So. 874 (1924); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co.
v. Morrey, supra note 5o; Indianapolis Abattoir Co. v. Neidlinger, 174 Ind. 400.
92 N. E. 169 (19io).
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"negligence" is an allegation of mixed law and fact and thus is to be
treated as an ultimate fact . 2 Surely, anybody will freely admit that
there are fact bases to an act deemed negligent by courts, but there are
several objections to the rule suggested at this point. The first is that
the word "negligence" is a word defined by the court; hence it is a
legal term. Again, it is a standard, not a fact. Moreover, the statute
says that "facts", not admixtures of facts and law, should be pleaded.
The trouble here, as in so many other cases, has been that, prior to the
statute, lawyers were in the habit of using certain legal terms in their
pleadings. They were convenient and, in certain instances, the best
terms to use, for they sufficiently told the opposing party, his counsel,
and the court what the claimant had in mind and shortened pleadings.
The result was that, when a statute came along which demanded the
pleading of facts, the judges, seeing the efficacy of such legal words
and phrases, and being trained in their use, called them allegations of
fact, though they certainly dealt with rights and duties or were words
defined by the judiciary. But "negligently" and kindred words have
not even the saving grace of adequately informing others of the claim
involved. By now, it should be clear that my idea is that "negligently"
and like terms are language the definition of which the courts have as-
sumed. Thus, they have become legal expressions which, under the
code provision involved, are not pleadable. One whose action is based
on negligence should, in setting forth the careless act involved, state
the occurrences which will show that the alleged tort-feasor did not
conduct himself as a reasonable person should.
"Fraud", "fraudulent", and "fraudulently" are not especially in-
teresting because of any conflict of opinion as to whether they assert
fact or law. Of a host of cases dealing with these words, only a very
few decide that they state facts,7 3 though, as might be expected, a
72Ellis v. Central California Traction Co., supra note 3; Hill v. Fairhaven &
W. R. Co., supra note 55; Clark v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., supra
note 3.
7The following is a small selection of decisions holding that these terms are
statements of law. Chamberlain Mach. Works v. United States,.270 U. S. 347,46
Sup. Ct. 225, 7o L. ed. 619 (1926); Williamson v. Beardsley, 137 Fed. 467, 69 C.
C. A. 615 (C. C. A. 8th, I9o5); Cella v. Brown, I44 Fed. 742, 75 C. C. A. 608 (C.
C. A. 8th, 19o6); Wannamaker v. Edisto Nat. Bank of Orangeburg, 62 F. (2d) 696
(C. C. A. 4th, 1933); Driesbach v. Beckham, supra note 2; Finch v. Watson Inv.
Co., 42 S. W. (2d) 214 (Ark. I93i); La Mesa Lemon Grove & Spring Valley Irr.
Dist. v. Halley, 195 Cal. 739, 235 Pac. 999 (1925); Earl v. Lofquist, 27 P. (2d) 416
(Cal. App. 1933); Martinez v. Martinez, 57 Colo. 292, 141 Pac. 469 (1914); State
v. Martin, 198 Ind. S16, i54 N. E. 284 (1927); Legler v. West Side Mut. Fire Ins.
Ass'n of Linn County, 243 N. W. 157 (Iowa 1932); Gorsage v. Steinmann-McCord
& CO., 138 Kan. 400, 26 P. (2d) 455 (1933); R. G. Wilmott Coal Co. v. State Pur-
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minority view does exist.7 4 What is interesting is the fact that the
courts are so certain that "fraud" treats of law, whereas there is so
little unanimity in regard to "negligence". We even discover such a
broad statement as this. "The term 'negligence' is not, like fraud, a
mere legal conclusion, or epithet applied to the act complained of.
Negligence is a fact." Why such a result has been reached is incom-
prehensible to me. The job of explaining the meaning of both of these
words has been taken over by the courts, and each should, therefore,
be deemed a statement of law.
Yet another set of expressions that has caused widespread difficulty
consists of "ownership", "owner", and "owns". Once again, we have a
direct clash of opinion as to whether these terms are statements of law
or fact. There are many who believe they aver law,7 5 but, probably,
chasing Commission, 246 Ky. 115, 54 S. W. (?d) 634 (1932); Cosmopolitan Trust
Co. v. S. L. Agoos Tanning Co., 245 Mass. 69, 139 N. E. 806 (1923); Young v.
Lindquist, 126 Minn. 414, 148 N. W. 455 (19x4); Jones v. Rogers, 85 Miss. 802,
38 So. 742 (19o5); Robinson v. Wiese, 210 S. W. 889 (Mo. 1919); Brandt v. McIn-
tosh, 47 Mont. 70, 13 Pac. 413 (1913); U. S. Theatre Supply Co. v. Creal, 241
N. W. 529 (Neb. 1932); Sugarman Iron & Metal Co. v. Morse Bros. Machinery &
Supply CO., 255 Pac. IOIO (Nev. 1927); Finsilver v. Still, 269 N. Y. Supp. 9 (1934);
Lanier v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 177 N. C. 200, 9 8 S. E. 593 (i919); Kelly v.
Scott, 125 Okla. 2o8, 257 Pac. 3o3 (1927); Interior Warehouse Co. v. Dunn, 80
Ore. 528, 157 Pac. 8o6 (1916); Schuster v. Largman, 3o8 Pa. 520, 162 Atl. 305
(1932); Drennan v. Brown, 112 S. C. 340, IOO S. E. 75 (1919); Madsen v. Madsen,
269 Pac. 132 (Utah, 1928); Quinn v. Valiquette, 8o Vt. 4 3 4 , 68 Atl. 515, 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 962 (19o8); Burke v. Bladine, 99 Wash. 383, 169 Pac. 8Ii (1918); Forest
County v. Shaw, 15o Wis. 294, 136 N. W. 642 (1912); Smith v. Stone, 21 Wyo. 62,
128 Pac. 612 (1912).
74Gwillim v. Asher, 71 Colo. 143, 204 Pac. 6o9 (1922); Taylor v. Jones, i5o So.
254 (Fla. I933); Langston v. Langston, I56 S. E. 469 (Ga. App. 1930); Hovey v.
Holcomb, ii Ill. 66o (1850); Zimmerman v. Willard, 114 Ill. 364, 2 N. E. 70
(1885); Drummond v. Allen Nat. Bank, 152 S. W. 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913);
Wetmore & Morse Granite Co. v. Bertoli, 87 Vt. 257,88 Atl. 898 (1913).
76Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. International Magazine Co., 294 Fed. 661 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1923); Kelley v. Kelley, 9 Ala. App. 3o6, 63 So. 740 (1913); Loud v.
Luse, 3 P. (2d) 542 (Cal. i93I); Foston v. Swanson, 3o6 Ill. 518, 138 N. E. i19
(1923); Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Ft. Wayne & Northern Indiana
Traction Co., 193 Ind. 4o5, 138 N. E. 759 (1923); McAnulty v. Peisen, 226 N. W.
x44 (Iowa, 1929); Gowin v. Lake, 243 Ky. 4 4 2, 4 8 S. W. (2d) X059 (1932); Levy v.
Deposito, 133 La. 126, 62 So. 599 (1913); Myerberg v. Hall, 162 Md. 578, 16o Atl.
621 (x932); Smith & Kinzer v. Dean, 19 Mo. 63 (1853); Wabaska Electric Co. v.
City of Wymore, 6o Neb. 199, 82 N. W. 626 (19oo); Oliver v. Enriquez, 17 N. M.
2o6, 124 Pac. 798 (1912); Irving Nat. Bank v. Gray, 174 App. Div. 29, 16o N. Y.
Supp. 341 (Ist Dept. 1916); Reynolds v. Gregg, 258 S. W. io88 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924); Buttles v. DeBaun, II6 Wis. 323, 93 N. W. 5 (1903). This is only a partial
list of cases. See, to same effect, Ross, Minnesota Pleading as "Fact Pleading"
(1929) 13 MINN. L. REv. 348.
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the majority opinion is that they allege fact.78 We find one of the advo-
cates of the latter view saying, "That the allegation of ownership is
the statement of a fact, is hardly to be questioned." 7 7 What assur-
ance! But listen to this. "In one sense it might be thought to be [an
allegation of law], because ownership depends upon the conclusion
which the law pronounces as the result of certain facts. But owner-
ship is, in reality, merely an ultimate fact resting on many other facts.
This does not require a pleader to state all the minute circumstances
and course of proceedings by which that ultimate fact will be estab-
lished. It is not at all necessary to aver with particularity how, or
from whom, or the precise method in which, the fact of that ownership
arose. That would be a matter of evidence."78 A few decisions claim
that "ownership" is a statement of mixed law and fact,7 9 since it em-
bodies, not alone the rights and duties inherent in the term, but also
the facts upon which they are based. This conclusion definitely ad-
mits the existence of the law side of the expressions dealing with
ownership. In the face of that admission, however, those terms, ac-
cording to these courts, may be pleaded by themselves. Let us in-
quire just how language relating to ownership should be classified. To
begin with, it seems plain that, when one says he is the owner of
something, he, in part at least, talks of enforceable rights and duties
in relation to some property. If that is true, and it seems uncontro-
vertible, how can anyone say "owner" is an allegation of fact? A pure
76O'Keefe v. Cannon, 52 Fed. 898 (C. C. Mont. 1892); Geo. Adams & Frederick
Co. v. South Omaha Nat. Bank, 123 Fed. 641, 6o C. C. A. 579 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o3);
Beall v. Folmar, ig Ala. 596, 75 So. 172 (1917); Aronson & Co. v. Pearson, 249
Pac. 191 (Cal. 1926); Gromer v. Papke, 71 Colo. 440, 207 Pac. 862 (1922); Griffith
v. Sands, 271 Pac. 191 (Clo. 1928); Domin v. Brush, I6I S. E. 8o9 (Ga. 1931);
Com'rs of Saline Co. v. Young, 18 Kan. 440 (1877); Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Scomp, 124 Ky. 330, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 487, 98 S. W. 1024 (I907); Curtiss v. Liv-
ingston, 36 Minn. 380, 31 N. W. 357 (1887); Berry v. Adams, 71 S. W. (2d) 126
(Mo. App. 1934); President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, I99 App.
Div. 767, 192 N. Y. Supp. 239 (Ist Dept. 1922); Red Hawk v. Jones, 278 Pac. 572
(Ore. 1929); Brasington v. Williams, 143 S. C. 223, 141 S. E. 375 (1927); Grace v.
Ballou, 4 S. D. 333, 56 N. W. 1075 (1893); Slayden-Kirksey Woolen Mill v. Robin-
son, 143 S. W. 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Robins v. Roberts, 15 P. (2d) 340 (Utah,
1932); Harris v. Halverson, 23 Wash. 779, 63 Pac. 549 (i9ox); Comstock v. J. R.
Droney Lumber Co., 69 W. Va. 100, 71 S. E. 255 (I9ii); Gillett v. Robbins, 12
Wis. 354 (186o); Watts v. Laurence, 26 Wyo. 367, 185 Pac. 719 (i919). This is
but a partial list of cases.
77L. L. & G. R. Co. v. Leahy, 12 Kan. 124 (1873).
78Jones v. Schaff Bros. Co., 187 Mo. App. 597, 174 S. W. 177 (1915). In accord
in principle: McCaughey v. Schuette, 1 17 Cal. 223,46 Pac. 666 (1896).
79Norton v. Newerf, 45 Cal. App. 10, 187 Pac. 57 (1919); McKee v. Jessup, 62
App. Div. 143, 7o N. Y. Supp. 796 (ist Dept., igoi); Gillett v. Robbins, supra
note 76; Marshall v. Wittig, 238 N. W. 390 (Wis. 1931).
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averment of fact can not possibly be tainted with legal ideas. That
being true, how is one properly to allege facts to support ownership?
Ah, there's the rub. I see no way out of it but to state the occurrences
that give one title. That means setting forth documents. But how far
are we to go back in the chain of title? It looks as if we would have to
go back to the original grant. This might not be so hard in some cases
when realty is involved, but to do this with personalty would, in a
vast number of cases, be impossible. What are we going to do about it?
What should be done is to eliminate the present statute and have a
rule allowing an allegation of ownership: What will be done? That is
another story. As in ages past, the legislative mills as to this matter
will grind slowly; courts, finding it intolerable to demand the pleading
of deeds, will, as of yore, permit pleaders to allege such terms as
"owner" without statements of facts, and they will say, whether they
believe it or not, that they are only permitting statements of facts.
And we laugh at the old formal action of ejectment! Have we a right
to smile, much less laugh, at ye lawyers of olde? It has been said that
to plead the deeds and occurrences connected with them is to plead
evidence,8 which procedure is not permissible under the code. Just
how is that true? What other facts do the existence and terms of the
transfer papers prove? None. Figure as long as you wish and the
answer must be that the deeds and occurrences just mentioned are
ultimate facts to which the courts are obliged to look in determining
the existence, or non-existence, of rights and duties bound up in the
ideai of ownership.
The final problem which I wish to discuss relates to the correct
method of pleading a contract. Here is found as great a clash of opin-
ion as is possible. We are told that one may plead a contract according
to its legal effect. 81 Thus, one is allowed to allege that the defendant
agreed to do certain things without pleading the contract.Y However,
the opposing view has its supporter."3 Again, we are informed that an
agreement may be set out either according to its legal effect or in its very
words.8 And, lo, the other possibility that one cannot plead the very
language of a contract, but must aver its legal effect.85 Read this.
8OSee cases supra note 78.
8 Giltner v. McCombs Producing & Refining Co., 19o Ky. 6oi, 228 S. W. 8
(1921); Jones v. Louderman, 39 Mo. 287 (I866).
8Giltnerv. McCombs Producing & Refining Co., supra note 81.
8White v. Maryland Casualty Co., r39 App. Div. 179, 123 N. Y. Supp. 840
(2d Dept. i9IO).
94Bank of Alameda County v. Hering, 25 P. (2d) ioo4 (Cal. App. 1933); Long v.
Dufur, 58 Ore. 162, 113 Pac. 59 (i9II).
8City & County of Denver v. Bowen, supra note 2; Strange-McGuire Paving
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"The statute requires the facts constituting the cause of action to be
stated... To set out in the petition in haec verba the contract on
which the case is founded is to plead the evidence, not the facts. A
pleader should determine in his own mind the legal effect of the written
contract or other document that underlies his case, and plead it by its
legal effect, as he understands it, and as he proposes to maintain it." ' So
the code permits that, does it? Let us see. We are told that we must
allege facts not law. Just what does one do when he states the legal
effect of a document. He does nothing other, nor less, than to interpret
the writing. He states what he thinks the rights and duties of the
parties to the instrument are. If that isn't stating law, please explain
when one would aver that which is legal. Therefore, the court first
says, "State not law," then it orders, "State it." What admirable
consistency! But, say the judges, if one pleads the very words of the
document, he sets forth evidence and acts contrary to the dictates of
the statute. To begin with, the legislation in question doesn't say
evidence cannot be stated. Presume, nevertheless, that it is improper
to plead evidence. How can one maintain that averring the exact
words of an instrument pleads evidence? Evidence proves facts. The
words of the contract under no circumstances prove other facts. They
are the last fringe of facts; they tell the court nothing about other
facts but give it the data, at least in part, from which the rights and
duties involved in the agreement may be determined. Is there by now
any question in the minds of those few souls who may read this that
the distinctions among law and the different types of facts is, to say
the very least, hazy to the general run of lawyers, both off and on the
bench? If you are not-yet convinced of that fact, give ear to these ex-
pressions of opinion:
"It is not easy to formulate a definition that will always de-
scribewhat is a mere conclusion of law so as to distinguish it from
apleadableultimatefact, or that will define how great an inclusion
of law will be held to enter into the composition of a pleadable
fact."87
"The line of separation between a conclusion of law and an al-
Co. v. Blauvelt, 77 Colo. 441, 237 Pac. 153 (1925); Reilly v. Cullen, 159 Mo. 322,
6o S. W. 126 (19oo); Haggerty v. St. Louis, K. & N. W. R. Co., IOO Mo. App.
424, 74 S. W. 456 (19o3); Cantrell v. Knight, 72 S. W. (2d) 196 (Mo. App. 1934);
United States Printing and Lithograph Co. v. Powers, 183 App. Div. 513, 170
N. Y. Supp. 314 (ist Dept. I918); Murphy v. New York Yellow Cab Co. Sales
Agency, 207 App. Div. 820,201 N. Y. Supp. 493 (2d Dept. 1923).
86Reilly v. Cullen, supra note 85. Italics are the author's.
87Clark v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., sura note 3; Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Hallauer, sl.pra note 14.
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legation of ultimate fact is as uncertain as the line separating
the cardinal colors in the spectrum." 8
Nor are these the only expressions of despair to be encountered in the
decisions. 89
The situation calls for drastic action, which, we know, will be very
slowly taken. But some day an aroused citizenry in the states where
the statute under consideration exists, finally realizing in part what an
unnecessary toll in time and money is being taken, will demand a
change. What type of law should be enacted? That depends upon the
purpose of a pleading which states a cause of action. The best general
idea of the function of language stating a cause of action which I have
found is discovered in Moore v. Hobbs.90 The court there says that a
cause of action should be so alleged that the defendant will be fully
informed as to the situation so that he can make his defense by proper
pleadings and proofs, and so that the jury and court may see what
they have to try and decide. Portions of this idea are found in several
other cases. 91 Another way of putting the same general idea is dis-
covered in the thought that one should so plead his cause that his
adversary should not be taken by surprise during the proceedings.9 2
Perhaps there is, in the background, the idea of proper notice when
courts say that one purpose of pleading should be to avoid prolixity."
8sGill v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., ii Ariz. 232, 95 Pac. 89 (igo8).
8 9Levins v. Rovegno, s4pra note 15; Huber v. H. R. Douglas Inc., 94 Conn.
167, io8 Atl. 727 (1919); Crane v. Schaefer, 140 Il. App. 647 (19o8); Mallinger v.
Webster City Oil Co., 234 N. W. 254 (Iowa, 1931); Maylender v. Fulton County
Gas & Electric Co., 227 N. Y. Supp. 209 (1928); Oregon Home Builders v. Mont-
gomery Inv. Co., supra note 33; Laun v. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N. W. I83, 5
A. L. R. 655 (1914); Tesch v. Industrial Commission, supra note I6.
9079 N. C. 535 (1878).
9 Lumleyy. Wabash R. Co., 71 Fed. 21 (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1895); Foxy. Hale &
Norcross Silver-Min. Co., 53 Pac. 32 (Cal. 1898); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v.
Jeffers, 34 Ga. App. 35, 128 S. E. 202 (1925); Sparks v. Floyd County, 15 Ga.
App. 80, 82 S. E. 583 (1914); Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425, 133 N. E. 310 (1921);
Avery v. Dougherty, 102 Ind. 443, 2 N. . 123, 52 Am. Rep. 680 (1885); State v.
Hackley, Hume & Joyce, 124 La. 854, 50 So. 772 (I909); State to the use of Jeter
v. Schwind Quarry Co., supra note 63; Greenfield v. Nye, 373 App. Div. io6, 159
N. Y. Supp. 344 (ist Dept. I916); Stabilimento Metallurgico Ligure v. Joseph,
389 App. Div. 173; 178 N. Y. Supp. 241 (ist Dept. i919); Donaldson v. Temple,
96 S. C. 24o, 8o S. E. 437 (S. C. 1915); Hicks v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement
Co., 229 S. W. 348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Con, 3o S. W.
(2d) 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Hunter, 109 Va. 34r,
64 S. E. 44 (I9O9); Matthews v. LaPrade, 144 Va. 795, 130 S. E. 788 (1925);
Williams v. Brunson, 41 Wis. 418 (3877); Weber v. Naas, supra note 2.
"Winne v. Colorado Springs Co., supra note 59; Brainard v. Van Dyke, 71 Vt.
359, 45 Atl. 758 (1899).
9
'Simon v. Stangl, 54 F. (2d) 73 (Minn. 1931); Curtiss v. Livingston, 36 Minn.
e
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To me, the general conception that the purpose of pleading a cause
of action is to give fair notice to all concerned of what the cause con-
sists is correct. However, the usual idea that this must be done by
stating ultimate facts appears to be unsound. My reason for this dif-
ference of opinion is, as I hope has been clearly shown, that, in a
multitude of instances, no general agreement as to whether a term
states law or fact, evidentiary or ultimate, seems possible. Again, if
clarity demands the pleading of evidence, that should be permitted.
How, then, should the statute read? I propose the following enact-
ment, or, where possible, rule of court. Every cause of action is to be
stated in plain and reasonably concise language, without unnecessary
repetition. It shall give fair notice of the claim involved to all persons con-
cerned. Statements of law and evidence are permissible when conciseness
or fair notice are promoted by their use.
We have made a detailed study of this matter and some of us may be
convinced of the righteousness of our cause. But let us not be deluded.
Change will not come in a hurry. There is, as yet, too little active inter-
est favorable to a different order, and there is far too much diligent
concern among certain influential lawyers who, for various reasons
which need no statement, desire the present regime. It is only when a
militant populace takes a hand in this matter and sends to the legisla-
tures the proper type of men and women that we can hope, in many
states, for the thorough purging of our procedural laws that is today,
and for centuries has been, a crying need. But mark my word-that
day will come though, perhaps, only in the yet dim and distant future.
380, 31 N. W. 357 (1887); Gillett v. Robbins, supra note 76; Marshall v. Wittig,
supra note 79.
